Abstract In this paper we revisit the many studies that have attempted to explain the determinants of commercial real estate capitalization rates. We introduce two new innovations. First we are able to incorporate two macroeconomic factors that greatly impact cap rates besides treasury rates and local market fundamentals -the variables most commonly used in such research. These are the general corporate risk premium operating in the economy, and the growth rate of debt relative to GDP in the general economy (liquidity). The addition of these factors greatly adds to the ability of previous models to explain the secular fall of cap rates in the last decade and their recent rise -in terms of traditional measures of within-sample fit. Our second innovation is methodological; our analysis uses a large and robust quarterly panel data set of over 30 US metropolitan areas from 1980q1 through 2009q3. With this data we compare 3 models: a "base model" and then one that selectively adds each of our macro-economic variables. We test the ability of each of these models to fit the 2002-2009 period using "back test" dynamic forecasts. Our conclusion is that much of the secular decline in cap rates from 2000 through 2007 and their subsequent rise seem attributable to the macro-economic factors and less to movements in market fundamentals.
Introduction
In this paper we revisit many studies that have attempted to explain the determinants of real estate capitalization rates. 1 We introduce several new innovations. First we are able to show that macroeconomic factors other than the risk-free government treasury rates greatly impact cap rates. These are the general corporate risk premium operating in the economy, and the amount of debt (liquidity) issued in the economy. The addition of these factors greatly adds to the ability of previous models to explain the rise of cap rates in the early 1990s, the secular fall of cap rates in the last decade, and the recent rise during the "financial crisis".
Methodologically, our analysis uses a large and robust quarterly panel data set of over 30 US metropolitan areas from 1980q1 through 2009q3. We compare models not only using traditional measures of within sample "fit", but also examine how the models behave in in-sample "back test" forecasts. Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the literature on cap rates. Next, we detail our panel data base and outline the basic econometric model that is used, and then present our results from this basic model as well as results from extended models, which introduce additional macroeconomic variables. We then compare the ability of the three models to explain changes in cap rates over the last 3 decades, using traditional measures of "fit", and examine their relative performance using within-sample back test forecasts. The discussion and interpretation of our findings is offered in conclusion.
Background and Literature
The starting point of our paper is a long literature on the determinants of real estate capitalization rates. A number of studies have modeled cap rates as an adjustment around equilibrium values, which are in turn determined by real estate fundamentals such as rent levels and rental growth, as well as risk-free interest rates (see Sivitanides et al. 2001 , Hendershott and MacGregor 2005a , 2005b Chen et al. 2004; Chichernea et al. 2008 Sivitanidou and Sivitanides 1999 , Shilling and Sing 2007 . Only one of these studies also includes any kind of metric representing a risk premium(see Archer and Ling 1997) . Our paper draws on this literature to specify what we term as our "Null" hypothesis -a standard, literature-based model with risk free rates and real estate fundamentals in determining capitalization rates. We specifically draw on Sivitanides et al. 2001 for this task. A related line of inquiry asks about the "efficiency" of real estate pricing -in particular whether cap rates have the expected predictive power in explaining subsequent real estate returns (Hendershott and MacGregor 2005a , 2005b , Ghyles et al. 2007 .
To this literature we more carefully add an impact of economy-wide risk premiums -assessing the impact of risk across property types. We also introduce the idea that the macro-economic capital flows -in particular the availability of debtmay impact capital pricing. In the literature, there are theoretical models of asset pricing in which capital flows play an obvious role (for example Geltner et al. 2007 , Wheaton 1999 . Empirically, some recent work on real estate returns has begun to include the dynamics of commercial real estate capital flows Naranjo 2003, 2006 as well as Fisher et al. 2007 ). Concern over the obvious simultaneity between flows and returns has been raised over this line of research. Naranjo 2003, 2006 find that capital flows into public (securitized) markets do not predict subsequent returns, while returns do impact subsequent capital flows. Other studies, however, find evidence that lagged institutional capital flows do have an effect on current returns at the aggregate level (Fisher et al. 2007) . In this study we avoid the simultaneity issue by using aggregate US capital flows rather than those directed at real estate. Furthermore, we do not consider equity, but only the availability and issuance of overall debt in the economy.
In this regard we draw on a long macro-economic literature concerning the role of debt availability in generating asset demand and asset "bubbles" (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997, Miller and Stiglitz 2008) . In recent years, these ideas have spawned a literature on what is termed "global imbalances" (see Caballero et al. Forthcoming) . This thesis postulates that due to the heterogeneity in countries' ability to produce financial assets for domestic savers, large capital flows from developing countries to developed ones have tremendously increased debt availability and have bid up asset prices, including those of real estate. In this paper we specifically examine whether trends in the growth of overall debt in the US economy can help in explaining movements in real estate cap rates over the last decade.
Our paper is most closely related to the recent work by Chervachidze et al. 2009 (from now on CCW). The CCW paper (which presents early results from the research done for our current paper) also tests the impact of debt availability on asset pricing, but uses a different less precise measure of debt, which is subject to greater noise.
Specifically, CCW use the net change in debt divided by that quarter's GDP (both the net change in debt and GDP are annualized quarterly values) as a measure of "debt flow." While this variable is a valid proxy for debt availability, it suffers from a drawback of being strongly affected by random swings in quarterly changes in debt outstanding, making it subject to significant noise. Secondly, the variable in CCW does a poor job of capturing the effect that the difference between the growth rate of debt and the growth rate of GDP has on credit availability. For example, total debt availability in the economy may be decreasing in cases when GDP is growing faster than the growth in total debt outstanding (in such a case the economy would actually be deleveraging even though total debt is growing and net changes in debt are positive), but the measure used in the CCW would not capture this effect (the reverse would hold in case of debt growth outstripping the growth in GDP). Both of these issues are remedied by using the growth rate of the debt-to-GDP ratio, which is less noisy and accounts for the difference between the growth rates of debt and GDP What Determined the Great Cap Rate Compression of 2000-2007, and the Dramatic Reversal... by construction. This is the variable we use in our paper, as is explained in greater detail below.
Furthermore, there are differences in the emphasis between CCW and our paper. Specifically, the emphasis of CCW is two-fold: explain the cap rate compression of 2000 -2007 by introducing the effect of debt availability as well as devise a proxy for investor sentiment using a panel version of CUSUM structural change tests. CCW find evidence of strong effect of debt on pricing as well as the existence of long-run structural change in the capitalization rate relationship, which the authors suggest might proxy investor sentiment. The goal of our paper, on the other hand, is more focused: to test how well the model extended with a debt availability variable (which is better behaved than the one used in CCW) explains the cap rate compression and reversion in the recent crisis. The additional data points from the recent recession provide a valuable test of the explanatory power of the model with debt, something that was not available to CCW (their data ends in 2007q4 before cap rate reversion takes place). Finally, both CCW and our work are related to the doctoral dissertation by Chervachidze 2010, which addresses these topics at greater length.
With the exception of CCW and Chervachidze 2010, our extensions of the current literature are four-fold. First, rather than use a 2-step error-correction specifications frequently used to model cap rates we rely on the suggestion of Gallin 2006 and use a single-step adjustment model. Secondly, instead of relying on a short national time series often employed in such analysis, we gain immense degrees of freedom by working with a panel data base combining the time series of over 30 US markets. Finally, we specifically examine the role of economy-wide debt availability. Particularly in the last decade, the widespread availability of debt and then the sudden contraction of this source of capital is often felt to be an important factor explaining the drop in cap rates from 2000-2006 and then their sudden recent rise.
Data and Historic Movements
Like most other studies of US capitalization rates, we utilize the appraisal-based values reported since the early 1980s by the National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF). NCREIF cap rates have often been criticized for not being based on actual sales transactions, but in the US they are the sole source of data going back several decades. Our data on rental rates comes from CBRE Econometric Advisors (formerly Torto Wheaton Research), and utilizes their rent indices created by applying hedonic analysis to data on thousands of actual lease transactions in each market.
In Fig. 1 , we illustrate the two factors from our "Null" model that have previously been studied as influencing the NCREIF cap rate: the 10 year Treasury rate and the deflated (constant dollar) rent index for properties. We use the office market in New York as our example. Like many US markets, office cap rates in that city moved between 6 and 10% over the last 2 decades, then declined sharply to 4% from 2002 to 2006, only to jump back to 7.5% in the last year. Against this we depict the real 10 year treasury rate and the real level of office rents. Over this S. Chervachidze, W. Wheaton 25 year period, real interest rates steadily declined until the current financial crisis, and visually there does seem to be some positive correlation with caps rates. Constant dollar rents vary almost 100% from index values of 0.7 to 1.3. When measured contemporaneously, they seem on casual inspection to move inversely with cap rateswhen rates are high rents are low. This affords some support for those studies arguing that markets inefficiently price current conditions and are not forward-looking.
In Fig. 2 we introduce the first of our two macro-economic factors and plot the NYoffice capitalization rate alongside a general debt risk premium (spread). Here we use the spread between the Moody's AAA yield and the 10 year Treasury bond. Finally, in Fig. 3 we compare the cap rate with our measure of the growth in the debt as a fraction of GDP. Since the growth rate in the debt-to-GDP ratio equals the difference between the growth rates of the numerator and the denominator, we graph the annual growth rates of the individual components, as well as their difference in Fig. 4 . During the 1980-2009q3 period, the ratio of debt to GDP has increased by a factor of 2.3 -which amounts to an average yearly increase of about 2.8%. In other words, the difference between the growth rates of debt and GDP has been on average about 2.8% on an annual basis.
It is important to note that the debt measured here is gross debt and not final debt by households. If a household borrows from a bank, which then borrows that money from, say, a securitized public market -then such debt is counted twice. Similarly, firm borrowing can have many redundancies. Hence, much of the growth in debt reflects an increase in financial intermediation. The question we ask then is whether increases in financial intermediation make it "easier to borrow" and whether this in turn impacts asset prices. If we were measuring asset prices in dollars, there would of course be high simultaneity between prices and borrowing. Loan demand surely increases with rises in asset prices. But here we are regressing growth in intermediation against cap rates to see if greater availability of debt and liquidity spur investors to "gamble" by paying more per dollar of current income.
Historically, our index of the annual growth in debt/GDP shows three periods where financial intermediation grew rapidly (i.e. the growth in debt was much higher than the growth in GDP). The first one was in the mid 1980s, which was marked by a pronounced boom on Wall Street, with financial intermediation subsequently stalling and taking a step backwards in the early 1990s. The other two periods were in 1999-2003, and then in 2005-2007 , with both periods characterized by rapid growth in securitization. The ratio of debt to GDP has declined significantly (albeit with a lag) as a result of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Since GDP has declined at the same time as firms and households have been reducing debt, this reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio is especially noteworthy, implying sharp deleveraging in the economy. In terms of the 1981.4 1982.4 1983.4 1984.4 1985.4 1986.4 1987.4 1988.4 1989.4 1990.4 1991.4 1992.4 1993.4 1994.4 1995.4 1996.4 1997.4 1998.4 1999.4 effect of debt availability on capitalization rates and asset pricing, the correlation is not so apparent in Fig. 3 , but in our multivariate analysis we will find it to be very strong. Using this data we estimate a separate model for each type of real estate (office, retail shopping centers, multifamily housing, and industrial). The macro-economic data is the same for each type of real estate -only the rent series and cap rates vary across property categories. For each model we use an unbalanced panel (they contain missing values for some observations) that spans the period from 1980q1 to 2009 q3. Each panel has over 30 MSA markets and a statistical summary of the data set is found in the Appendix. As a result of missing values, the dataset for each property type contains from 1,920 to 3,175 usable observations, which generates high degrees 1980Q4 1981Q3 1982Q2 1983Q1 1983Q4 1984Q3 1985Q2 1986Q1 1986Q4 1987Q3 1988Q2 1989Q1 1989Q4 1990Q3 1991Q2 1992Q1 1992Q4 1993Q3 1994Q2 1995Q1 1995Q4 1996Q3 1997Q2 1998Q1 1998Q4 1999Q3 2000Q2 2001Q1 2001Q4 2002Q3 2003Q2 2004Q1 2004Q4 2005Q3 2006Q2 2007Q1 2007Q4 2008Q3 2009Q2 2010Q1 Annual 1980Q4 1981Q3 1982Q2 1983Q1 1983Q4 1984Q3 1985Q2 1986Q1 1986Q4 1987Q3 1988Q2 1989Q1 1989Q4 1990Q3 1991Q2 1992Q1 1992Q4 1993Q3 1994Q2 1995Q1 1995Q4 1996Q3 1997Q2 1998Q1 1998Q4 1999Q3 2000Q2 2001Q1 2001Q4 2002Q3 2003Q2 2004Q1 2004Q4 2005Q3 2006Q2 2007Q1 2007Q4 2008Q3 2009Q2 2010Q1 Annual Growth Rate of Debt/GDP of freedom. In terms of our estimation approach, all models in this paper are estimated using the fixed effects panel method (see Greene 2004) , with White's heteroskedasticity correction for standard errors (White 1980) 2 . The rationale behind this estimation strategy is compelling. The fixed effects panel technique allows us to use both time-series as well as cross-sectional (between MSA) variation, which increases the efficiency of the OLS estimators (see Greene 2004) . This generates better estimates of model coefficients. Furthermore, it explicitly models for the time-invariant differences (hence the name fixed effects) in trends between the cross-sectional MSA units. This framework is consistent with theoretical expectations that market-specific unobserved characteristics will lead to permanent differences in capitalization rate trends across markets, and the fixed effects method allows us to estimate the effect of these unobservables and test for their statistical significance. Finally, the higher estimator efficiency increases the power of post-estimation tests, which allows for better inferences about results. Table 1 lists all variables used in this paper as well as their sources 3 . The statistical summary for these variables is given in the Appendix.
Among the right-hand-side variables, the Real Rent Ratio is the only one that exhibits full cross-sectional as well as time series variation. The national macroeconomic variables are of course the same for each cross-sectional unit. As such, this setup prevents us from including time fixed effects in the models, since these would absorb the impact of the national macroeconomic variables.
To put the cross-sectional variation in perspective, . Since we use an unbalanced panel in our setup, Fig. 5 shows that the sample generally starts with a few observations (about 10 in 1981q4 for cap rates and 25 for the Real Rent Ratio) and then picks up more cross-sectional units over time, reaching the full cross-sectional dimension of 38 MSA's by late 1990's.
2 While our fixed effects panel data specification includes lagged dependent variables, thus making the fixed effects estimator biased in finite samples, this bias approaches zero as the time dimension of the sample becomes sufficiently large. Specifically, the fixed effects (FE) estimator with lagged dependent variables is biased and inconsistent in N, (where N is the number of cross-sectional units and T is the time span of the sample), thus necessitating the use of alternative estimators (such as the Arellano and Bond estimator) in microeconomic studies, which are usually marked by "short and fat" panels (i.e. large N and small T, typically less than 3 or 4). At the same time, FE is consistent in T (i.e. the bias disappears as the length of the sample approaches infinity), thus making its use in "long and thin" panels a legitimate timeseries exercise (it is straightforward to show this property of FE; Nickell 1981 provides a derivation). The time dimension is quite large in our sample (T = 120), making the application of FE legitimate (Judson and Owen 1999 find that bias becomes significant around T=20, which is much smaller than our T = 120). For additional discussion on properties of the fixed effects estimator, refer to Greene 2004. 3 To ensure that our time series estimation strategy is sound, we test for stationarity in levels (the test is for ADF regression with a constant and no trend) of all variables by using ADF unit root tests. We reject the null of unit root for all variables/markets, implying that all our series are stationary in levels (this is in line with literature on mean reversion of interest rates and yields as well as the literature on mean reversion of real rents in commercial real estate). 4 The cross-sectional statistics depicted in Fig. 6 are constructed by calculating the appropriate statistic over the available cross-sectional observations at each time period (i.e. at time t, we calculate mean and variance of cap rates and the Real Rent Index across all available observations at time t). Figure 6 shows that in case of both the cap rate and the Real Rent Ratio variables, most of variation is of time-series type. It is interesting to note that while there is no apparent correlation between cap rate variance and mean cap rate over time (variance generally decreases towards the end of the sample, as more cross-sectional units are included), there seems to be a strong relationship between the variance of the Real 
Number of Cross Sectional Observations per Time Period Office
Countof RWCAP Countof RRR Rent Ratio and its mean. Specifically, Fig. 6 indicates that in the booming phase of the business cycle, when real rents are above their mean trend, variation in rents also increases. The reverse is true in periods of low average real rents associated with the trough of the business cycle. This seems to imply that variation of real rents between markets is dependent on the stage of the business cycle, an artifact worthy of future research.
The "Null" Specification: Market fundamentals and Treasury Rates
The first, most basic model intends to reflect the standard approach used in the literature to date (for reference see Sivitanides et al. 2001 , from now on SSTW). This Gallin 2006) and instead postulates that cap rates simply follow an adjustment process around equilibrium values. The equilibrium is estimated at the same time as the adjustment and is determined by two sets of influences: 1) the influences of a discount rate that reflects both the opportunity cost of capital and systematic market risk; (2) fundamental factors that shape investors' income growth expectations. This is in keeping with the literature, which usually uses rental fundamentals and some proxy for interest rate to explain cap rates. As discussed above, the standard specification we use is given in (1). It is formulated so as to be comparable to more extended specifications used below.
In this panel specification j is Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) and t is time. This is estimated separately for each property sector. The variables are as follows:
Capitalization rate from NCREIF database calculated from Net Operating Income and asset values.
This is real rent ratio calculated as a ratio of real rent data from CBRE EA rent database for a given MSA in a given quarter to the historical average of real rent for this MSA:
where the mean is calculated over sample time period for each j.
RTB t
Real T-Bond yield calculated as nominal yield minus inflation rate; this proxies risk-free rate and the opportunity cost of capital. Q2 t, Q3 t,, Q4 t, Seasonal dummies to take out seasonality D j
Fixed market-level effects associated with each MSA
In terms of theoretical priors on the signs of coefficients, the risk free rate (RTB) is expected to have a positive effect on the cap rates. The effect of the real rent ratio RRR, on the other hand, is theoretically ambiguous and depends on whether investors are forward or backward-looking. The real rent ratio is a stationary series with a strong tendency to mean revert (SSTW). In case of forward-looking expectations, high rent levels (as compared to historical means) will inform investors that the market is at the peak of the cycle, and a downward adjustment is in order, causing them to expect lower cash flows in the future. If investors possess this paradigm, RRR will have a positive effect on capitalization rates. Alternatively, if investors are backward-looking (as evidenced by SSTW), investors will project current rent growth into the future and will bid up asset values accordingly. This mindset implies a negative effect of the rent ratio on cap rates. These expectations are in line with the long existing literature as discussed in the previous section. Finally, the MSA-level fixed effects (dummy variables) D j account for non-varying market-specific characteristics not explicitly included in the model. Table 2 depicts estimation results for this basic model on our data set. The sum of the coefficients on lagged cap rates is around 0.8 indicating considerable momentum in the creation of appraisal cap rates. The real T-bond coefficient has the expected positive sign across property sectors and is statistically significant. The real rent ratio, the variable without an a priori sign expectation, has a statistically significant negative sign, which testifies to the backward-looking behavior of real estate investors, and is generally consistent with previous research.
The group test for the collective effect of MSA dummies yields insignificant statistics for all property types but retail, while individual tests show that some MSAs are significant, while others are not. This is in line with findings in SSTW, indicating that only some markets exhibit statistically significant differences in average cap rate levels.
Extended Model Specification: Adding a Risk Premium
In this specification, we attempt to improve on the existing literature by including one new variable: the degree of general risk aversion in the economy (and hence the associated premium demanded by investors for this risk). We measure this with a standardized corporate bond spread. Specifically, we extend (1) with the following specification:
The model setup is the same as in (1) with the addition of the SPREAD variable. Details are as follows: SPREAD t Economy wide risk premium over the risk-free rate, calculated as the difference between Moody's AAA Corporate Bond Index and the 10-year T-Bond.
The expected coefficient signs for the variables carried over from (1) are the same as before. In terms of the new variable, SPREAD is expected to have a positive sign (with investors demanding compensation for higher risk in the form of lower asset values for the same NOI stream).
The extended model is again estimated using fixed effects with White's heteroskedasticity correction on the same unbalanced panel sample as the one used for standard model (1). Results of estimating the extended model (2) are given in Table 3 . It is interesting that all coefficients have the expected signs and are significant across the four property types and that the addition of SPREAD has not changed the sign or significance of the original rental ratio and Treasury yield variables. This suggests that the new factor is largely orthogonal to the original factors. In terms of point estimates, the sum of the coefficients on lagged cap rates is still around .8, but the coefficients on the rent ratio and real Treasury rate are increased. Finally, as was the case in the case (1) and (2) show an improvement in the performance of the extended specification (2) vis-à-vis the standard version (1) across all property types. The extended model results in higher adjusted R squared statistics, and goodness of fit tests (discussed below in Table 5 ) and confirms the value of the additional variable. More importantly, however, the orthogonality and statistical significance of the risk spread variable indicates its importance in determination of capitalization rates. Clearly it should be included in future research on capitalization rates. This finding is in line with theoretical expectations that the risk premia demanded by investors have strong effects on real estate asset pricing, and omitting these factors in cap rate models has been a major deficiency in most of the literature so far.
Extended Model Specification: Adding Debt Availability
Our final and complete specification examines the possible importance of the availability of debt -as measured by the quarterly growth in overall economy wide ratio: Debt/GDP. Traditional financial economics implies that capital structure should not matter in an efficient market. Specifically, in equilibrium asset pricing theory, the amount of debt applied to an asset should not impact its price, as risk increases commensurately. But as discussed above, recent economic thinking calls this into question. Macro-economic theory now regards debt availability as a frequent cause of financial crises, and micro-economic theory argues that debt provides purchase liquidity. Thus when debt is scarce, real estate transactions are more difficult, and prices may fall below their fundamental value. Easy debt encourages transactions and can increase asset prices above fundamental value -possibly into a "bubble". Hence, we add a variable, which proxies for debt availability as is described below.
DEBT_AVAIL t Debt Availability as proxied by the annual growth rate in Total Debt Outstanding t /GDP t . Both series are nominal numbers from the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds Database: DEBT_AVAIL t =Year-on-Year Change in (Total Debt Outstanding t /GDP t )
The coefficient sign for DEBT_AVAIL is expected to have a positive effect on asset values as (and a negative effect on cap rates), as ceteris paribus investors will bid up asset values when it becomes easier to trade them. The test of this effect and its magnitude is especially relevant in the current environment where the general What Determined the Great Cap Rate Compression of 2000-2007, and the Dramatic Reversal... lack of debt financing is postulated to have an important negative influence on real estate asset prices.
The extended model is again estimated using fixed effects with White's heteroskedasticity correction on the same unbalanced panel sample as the one used for standard model (2). Results of estimating the extended model (3) are given in Table 4 . It is interesting that all coefficients once more have the expected signs and are significant across the four property types. It is furthermore of note that the addition of DEBT_AVAIL has not changed the sign or significance of the original real rent ratio, the real Treasury yield, or the risk premium variables. In fact, in Table 4 the point estimates of the other two macro variables increase when the debt variable is included, suggesting again remarkable orthogonality. Finally, as was the case in model (1), group tests on the collective significance of MSA fixed effects indicate group insignificance for all property types except multifamily.
Comparison of Alternative Specifications: Goodness-of-fit, Back-tests, and Forecasts Table 5 offers abbreviated goodness-of-fit results for all three specifications used in this paper used (equations (1), (2), and (3)) as well as Wald specification tests for the three equations. Specifically, the specification tests are implemented as Wald tests for exclusion restrictions on the additional variables (Greene 2004) . That is, we start with the most comprehensive model (3) and first test the null hypothesis that the coefficient a 8 on the DEBT_AVAIL is equal to zero. Next, we test the joint exclusion restriction on the coefficients on all three variables that are not in specification (1)-DEBT_AVAIL and spread (i.e. this tests H 0 : a 8 =a 7 =0). In this sense, equations (1) and (2) are nested with the comprehensive model (3), and the specification search can be conducted by testing these exclusion restrictions (Greene 2004) .
As can be seen from Table 5 , the progression of specifications from (1) to (2) and to (3) at each stage produces a statistically significant increase in explanatory power of the model. This is further confirmed by the goodness of fit statistics such as the adjusted R squared. This ranking testifies to the importance of these additional macro-economic financial factors in modeling capitalization rates.
While the goodness-of-fit tests utilized above are an important indicator of the relative model performance, they are not always conclusive. Specifically, when lagged dependent variables are used, dynamic models customarily generate high measures of fit (and this is true in our case). It is often hard to judge between the various model specifications when they all exhibit such high measures of fit.
A complimentary approach to judge the relative model performance is to construct a number of back-tests to ascertain the ability and effectiveness of each model to replicate historical data. Such back-tests start at a point in the historical data and use the equation estimated on the full historical sample to dynamically forecast the dependent variable within a specified sample period. With this approach, actual historical values for the model's exogenous right-hand-side variables are used, but any autoregressive terms (such as our lagged cap rates) use the previous period' s forecast. This is what distinguishes a dynamic in-sample forecast from the more common predicted values of the model used in R 2 calculations. The result of this S. Chervachidze, W. Wheaton Figure 7 shows the back-test results for all 3 models used in this paper, with both performance statistics and the graphs of back-test forecasts. All back tests are performed against historical cap rates by using the model estimated on the entire sample to dynamically forecast capitalization rates from 2000q4 through the end of the sample in 2009q3 using historical data for the independent variables. These each model specification. These statistics, together with back-test plots, allow us to judge the relative success of the three models in explaining historical capitalization rates.
In the first graph of Fig. 7 , the actual weighted average cap rate for office properties rises by 100 bps from 2000q1 to 2002q2 and then declines steadily by almost exactly 400 bps to 2008q1. It then rises 200 bps between then and 2009q2. With the "null" model there is no rise around the 9/11 recession, the total decline is less than 200 bps. The recent rise is only 80 bps. On the other hand, the full extended model (with both risk premium and debt variables) has a slight 30 bps rise, then a steady decline of 300 bps and very close to the actual 200 bps recent increase. Examining the other plots shows that the null model does not do well at explaining the cap rate compression and sharp reversal over 2000-2009 for all property types. On the other hand, the full extended version of the model shows a marked improvement in explaining historical cap rates. The addition of the risk and debt variables makes a significant reduction in forecast error (over 2000q4-2009q3) using the various tests below each plot in Fig. 7 .
Conclusion
We draw several conclusions from this research about the behavior of appraisalbased real estate prices during the last 30 years and in particular during the last 9 years. First, despite the fact that the rent fundamentals of the 30 markets studied here vary widely, local rent fundamentals are really just a small part of the explanation of cap rates. In fact, the test for collective significance of the crosssection fixed effects is not significant. We find it hard to imagine that relative rents are the only local variable that matters, and that there are no other systematic factors between markets.
Secondly, our three macro-economic variables (real Treasury rate, bond risk premium, and expansion of debt) matter enormously, despite the fact that they have no local variation and are simply a common factor across time for our 30 markets. Each of these factors individually is highly significant and collectively they drive the model. With commercial real estate the old adage that "all real estate is local" does not seem to be true -at least with this data.
Finally, our results really do suggest a strong empirical relationship between asset prices and growth of debt within the economy. To address causality, the variable that we use is the ratio of total debt outstanding to GDP, and within this data, commercial real estate debt represents less than 6% of total current public and private debt. It is hard to argue that changes in commercial real estate prices are driving the entire debt structure of the economy. Still the very significant role of this variable only hints at the complex relationships that must exist between real estate prices and the availability of debt. What determines the amount of debt that investors want to put on property? Does the supply of debt and underwriting vary with the current position of the market? To what extent is debt rationed as opposed to being priced and why? Given the empirical relationship here, we need to return and reexamine the core theory of capital structure in real estate finance. 
Appendix

Statistical Summary of Variables
Note: since the time periods used in the panels differ by property type (except for office and industrial), the moments for national macro-economic variables and the number of included observations differ as a result. 
